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Although they are part of a large and
growing segment of world trade—and a
prominent feature in healthy, vibrant
economies—services are often overlooked
in trade negotiations in favor of higher-pro-
file trade in agriculture and manufactured
goods. Yet countries with more open ser-
vices markets benefit from higher growth
rates and living standards. Because services
are an input to most other sectors of the
economy, the benefits from open and com-
petitive markets are pervasive. Indeed, the
gains from lowering remaining trade barri-
ers in services would eclipse the gains from
trade liberalization in agriculture and man-
ufacturing. The recently derailed Doha
round of global trade talks seem to have put
globally coordinated efforts towards liberal-
izing services trade on the back burner for
the foreseeable future.
Fortunately, the United States does not
have to wait for a negotiated trade agree-
ment to benefit from a more open trade in
services.The United States should contin-
ue to press other nations, including devel-
oping countries, to open their markets to
American service providers, while remov-
ing unwieldy restrictions at home. By
autonomously reducing the remaining bar-
riers on maritime services, rail and air
transportation services, distribution ser-
vices, and restrictions on the temporary
entry of workers from abroad, many of the
benefits to American consumers and
industry will be realized regardless of what
other nations choose to do.
A Service to the Economy
Removing Barriers to “Invisible Trade”
by Sallie James
Sallie James is a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy
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Introduction
Few sectors in the economy are as underap-
preciated as services. Largely invisible, although
often an input to other more prominent goods,
they are the “silent majority” in the U.S. econo-
my. What is true of the United States is also true
globally: although they are part of a large and
growing segment of world trade, services are fre-
quently relegated to second-tier status in trade
negotiations. The Doha round of multilateral
trade talks at the World Trade Organization
recently collapsed over arguments about agricul-
tural trade barriers and, to a lesser extent, nona-
gricultural market access: delegates put services
on the back burner, to be dealt with after those
threshold issues were settled. The low priority
given to services trade is a failure of leadership
and a failure to recognize the importance of ser-
vices both in the world economy and to eco-
nomic development.
As with lowering barriers to trade in goods,
liberalizing services trade is likely to lead to
lower prices, improved competition and choice
for consumers, and improved productivity.
Because many services are an input to the pro-
duction of other services and goods, the indirect
effects can be especially pervasive. For example,
efficient financial services and insurance markets
lead to better risk sharing in the economy and
direct savings and investments to their best use
and economical open transport system enables
goods and people to flow more easily and con-
tributes to lower prices and increased trade.
Effective storage and distribution systems help
poor farmers get their perishable goods to mar-
ket. Telecommunications are vital to the spread
of information and entertainment and are an
especially important factor in efficient markets.
Education and health services are crucial to
human development. Access to foreign audio-
visual and other entertainment services benefits
consumers directly. An inefficient and inade-
quate services sector is therefore a de facto tax on
production.
The considerable, yet often unseen, contri-
bution of services to the global economy is
remarkable. One study estimates that the global
gains from free services trade would be over 30
times larger than those from agricultural trade
liberalization and more than twice the gains
from free trade in manufactured goods.1 More-
over, many of these gains are not dependent on
the actions of our trading partners: the United
States can open its markets to imported services
autonomously and reap rich rewards.
While all countries, including the United
States, can gain from deregulating service sec-
tors and introducing competition from abroad,
the benefits for developing countries appear
particularly stark. In a March 2006 document,
released at the time the United States made its
request to other World Trade Organization
members for improved access to markets as
part of the Doha round of trade negotiations,
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
stressed the role of services in promoting devel-
opment by improving the flow of goods within
and between countries, and in lowering trans-
action costs:
Removal of services barriers in sectors
such as telecommunications, trans-
portation, and financial services im-
proves competitiveness in the goods
sector, increases efficiency and produc-
tivity by enabling firms to track con-
sumer demand, facilitate product dis-
tribution, and expand global reach . . .
Access to efficient accounting and
legal services can lower transaction
costs . . . [and] enables investors to dis-
tribute their resources in a manner
that maximizes returns and spreads
risks. Access to health and education
services may benefit and build a coun-
try’s labor force and access to environ-
mental services supports efforts to
achieve sustainable economic develop-
ment.2
One of the best examples of how services can
disseminate technology is the recent growth of
mobile telecommunications. In a June 2005
article, The Economist hailed the extra benefits
that the growth of mobile technology can
bring to developing countries:
2
Liberalizing 
services trade is
likely to lead to
lower prices,
improved 
competition and
choice for 
consumers, and
improved 
productivity. 
Mobile phones have become indis-
pensable in the rich world. But they are
even more useful in the developing
world, where the availability of other
forms of communication—roads, post-
al systems or fixed-line phones—is
often limited.Phones let fishermen and
farmers check prices in different mar-
kets before selling produce,make it eas-
ier for people to find work, allow quick
and easy transfers of funds and boost
entrepreneurship.3
It should be no surprise that services trade is
growing, despite the many trade barriers that
remain.
A Large and Growing Sector
A transaction in services often requires prox-
imate contact for trade to take place, and the ser-
vice is “consumed” at the same time as it is “pro-
duced.” At least before international travel and
communications became so easy and cheap,
many services were therefore considered inher-
ently nontradable.That is still true of many ser-
vices: think of taxi services, for example, or hair-
cuts, where cross-border exchange is either
impossible or prohibitively expensive. Unlike
trade in goods, which is in many ways a substi-
tute for factor mobility (for example, the United
States is able to enjoy the benefits of products
that are unskilled-labor-intensive without
enjoying the comparative advantage that comes
from having a relative abundance in unskilled
labor), trade in services often requires some fac-
tor mobility.4
In 2007, the latest year for which statistics
are available, global services exports were $3.3
trillion, making up about 24 percent of total
world trade. That represented a growth rate of
18 percent over the previous year, compared
with the 15 percent growth rate of merchan-
dise trade.5
Given the emphasis on developing coun-
tries in the Doha round (indeed, the round is
formally named the Doha Development
Agenda), and the unfortunate mercantilist out-
look of WTO negotiations—where lowering
barriers to imports is seen as a necessary “con-
cession” in order to gain improved market
access for exports—it is perhaps not surprising
that services have been overlooked. Usually,
services account for a greater proportion of
economic activity in developed countries than
they do in developing countries. In other
words, developed countries are more likely
than developing countries to have export inter-
ests in services, as Figure 1 shows.
Economists often refer to a country’s “re-
vealed comparative advantage” in a given indus-
try, which can be calculated by dividing the share
of that industry in the country’s exports by the
share of that industry in total world exports. It is
an imperfect measure, since any country’s
exports of a good or service are influenced by
government interventions that have little to do
with natural comparative advantage. Indeed, the
most protected industries are often those which
go against a country’s comparative advantage:
industries in which a country has a comparative
advantage do not need to be protected or subsi-
dized. As a general rule, however, a revealed
comparative advantage number greater than one
would indicate that country has a comparative
advantage in a sector.
3
Figure 1
Services Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports, 2007
Source: World Trade Organization.
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Figure 1 shows graphically that developed
countries, as a group, have a revealed compara-
tive advantage in services (i.e., services exports
from developed countries are higher than that
of the world as a whole), whereas developing
countries, in general, do not. India is a notable
exception: their comparative advantage in ser-
vices is greater than even that of the United
States. In 2007, services accounted for 28 per-
cent of U.S. exports, but only 19 percent of
total world exports.6 Thus, the United States
has a revealed comparative advantage in ser-
vices of about 1.5 (compared to India’s 1.9).
The United States is trading according to its
comparative advantage. It is the world’s largest
exporter of commercial services, worth $254 bil-
lion in 2007. Although a substantial importer of
services, and indeed theworld’s largest, theUnited
States ran a surplus in services trade of $120 bil-
lion in 2007. Moreover, America’s imports of ser-
vices are growing at a slower rate—9 percent—
than its exports (14percent),7 although thegrowth
in services exports relative to imports could also
reflect the 2007 and early 2008 general trend of
slowing U.S. imports, as the U.S. economy slowed
compared to the rest of the world and the dollar
depreciated. In any case, trading according to our
comparative advantage is goodnews forAmerican
workers: the average wage in service-providing
industries is higher than the averagewage inman-
ufacturing industries.8 And research by the Office
of the United States Trade Representative has
shown that to be especially true of wages in ser-
vices export industries.9
The largest services trade surpluses are in
business and professional services, royalties and
license fees for intellectual property (e.g., music
and films), financial services, and education.10
The largest deficits in services are in insurance (as
U.S. firms pay European and Bermudan reinsur-
ers to assume some large risks) and transporta-
tion, largely accounted for by the deficit in man-
ufactured goods: more goods need to be trans-
ported into the United States than out of it.11
There are a number of reasons for the global
growth of the service sector. First, the world is
getting richer, and generally the service sector
grows as a percentage of GDP as economies
develop. A large and vibrant service sector is a
sure sign of a prosperous economy. Figure 2
shows private sector services as a percentage of
GDP (value added) in the American economy,
growing from about 51 percent in 1959 to 68
percent in 2007. Although by no means a nec-
essary progression, the “three-sector hypothesis”
of economic progression predicts that an econo-
my will be based mainly on the primary sector of
the economy (agriculture and the extractive
industries) in the early stages of development,
and then an increase in economic activity in the
secondary sector (manufacturing) will continue
until the economy is dominated by the tertiary
sector (services).12 A dynamic private service
sector is a sure sign of growth.
Table 1 shows the composition of employ-
ment in various regions of the world, and how
that composition has changed over the last
decade. The number of people employed in
services is increasing in all regions, and is posi-
tively correlated with national income. Em-
ployment in the agricultural sector has contin-
ued its natural decline.
The second reason the services industries are
growing is that there are simply more types of
tradable services today than there were previous-
ly. The Internet was almost unheard of two
decades ago, and yet the U.S. Internet service
providers, web search portals, and data process-
ing sector employed over 355,000 people in
2007.13 Marketing and advertising jobs, unwar-
ranted in subsistence economies or those domi-
nated by commodity goods, are likewise more
prevalent in complex capitalist economies.
Similarly, as people grow richer they are able to
outsource jobs such as landscaping to the mar-
ket sector, whereas previously homeowners
would have tended their lawns themselves.
Third, technological progress—particularly in
transportation, communications, and information
technology—facilitates trade in services across
borders (and even oceans) by lowering transaction
costs.The phenomenon of outsourcing data pro-
cessing, call center support, and even X-ray read-
ing work has only become viable now that inter-
national telecommunications and information ex-
change is relatively inexpensive.Cheaper air travel
makes international business trips or extended
assignments abroad easier and more profitable.
4
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to national income.
359863r2_TPA38_1stClass:359863r2_TPA38_1stClass  1/30/2009  7:17 AM  Page 4
Even private tutoring, based on a business model
stressing personal attention, has become an online
and cross-border business thanks to the growth of
the Internet.14 Service growth and development
begets more service growth and development.
Of course, the ease with which some services
can now be traded across borders has brought
new concerns in some quarters. The possibility
that previously nontradable services, like data
processing, are now able to be outsourced to ser-
5
A large and
vibrant service
sector is a sure sign
of a prosperous
economy.
Figure 2
The Importance of Services in U.S. GDP
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Accounts, April 29, 2008, www.bea.
gov/industry/gpotables/.
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Table 1
World and Regional Estimates of Employment by Sector (% of Total Workforce)
Agriculture Industry Services
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
World 41.9 36.1 21.1 21.9 37.0 42.0
Region
Developed Economies and EU 6.2 4.2 28.5 24.7 65.3 71.2
Central and South Eastern Europe
(non-EU) and CIS 27.2 20.3 28.7 25.8 44.1 53.8
East Asia 48.5 40.9 24.3 25.6 27.2 33.5
South-East Asia and the Pacific 51.0 45.4 16.5 18.6 32.5 36.0
South Asia 59.7 49.4 15.2 21.0 25.1 29.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 23.1 19.6 20.7 20.8 56.1 59.6
North Africa 36.5 34.4 19.8 20.0 43.7 45.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.4 65.9 7.5 10.0 18.1 24.1
Middle East 21.1 18.1 25.2 25.6 53.7 56.3
Source: International Labour Organization, “Key Indicators of the Labour Market,” fifth edition. International Labour
Office, September 2007, www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/index.htm.
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vice providers overseas has led to significant fears
about “offshoring.” But research suggests that the
theoretical potential for offshoring overestimates
what will eventually be offshored in practice: in a
2007 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Alan
Blinder suggested that up to 40million jobs in the
United States could potentially be offshored in
the next 10 to 20 years.15 In remarks to the
Peterson Institute of International Economics in
January 2008, however, Dr. Blinder made clear
that those figures refer only to the upper bound of
“offshorability,”and that the actual number of jobs
that are tradable in practice are likely to be
lower.16 The economist Brad Jensen concurs, and
at the same forum presented a paper that sug-
gestedAmerica’s comparative advantage in skilled
services is likely to benefit U.S. service workers
and firms through increased export opportunities.
Dr. Jensen suggests that only about one-third of
potentially tradable service jobs will be offshored
in practice, and that the United States will gain
through the “onshoring” of high-wage, high-skill
jobs.17 While about 40 percent of manufacturing
jobs are at risk of being offshored, these job loss-
es will be offset by job gains in the higher-paying,
higher-skilled services sector, which will grow as
a result of trade. In otherwords, increased trade in
services is likely to benefit the United States, and
fears about mass job losses are unfounded.
The fourth factor in services growth, the
deregulation of prominent services sectors in
developed countries (such as the 1970s deregula-
tion of railways in Britain and airlines in the
United States) has exposed those markets to
greater competition. Although there is much
room for improvement (and many service sectors
will probably remain nontradable), the deregula-
tion of the transportation and telecommunica-
tions sectors in developed countries and increas-
ingly globalized supply chains have increased the
scope for the international flow of services. The
growth of the middle class in developing coun-
tries offers much promise for developed-country
firms that sell services such as banking,which is a
largely open and mature sector in developed
countries, but is ripe for growth in countries such
as India, where most citizens who are not
involved in priority sectors such as agriculture
must rely on informal moneylenders for credit.
Fifth, the inclusion of services trade in the
Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations
and other services trade liberalization efforts has
undoubtedly contributed to more freely flowing
services across borders. Certainly service industry
groups, whose concerns are given low priority by
trade negotiators, have much to be frustrated
about—but progress is being made.
Services Liberalization is
a Work in Progress
What explains the relatively low attention
given to services trade, given its economic im-
portance? It is partly a response to its difference
from goods trade, where the products and issues
involved have been familiar to trade negotiators
since their inclusion in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. Services, on the
other hand, were only integrated into the
GATT/WTO architecture in 1994. Trade
negotiators, when analyzing the tariff and sub-
sidy cuts on offer, use detailed analyses of mem-
bers’ lists of tariffs to estimate the effects of tar-
iff-cutting formulae on imports, exports, and
tariff revenue. These economic effects are rela-
tively transparent and easy to analyze using stan-
dard economic tools, which, by definition, apply
directly only to foreign goods.
Services, on the other hand, face relatively
few—if any—of the conventional border mea-
sures such as tariffs and quotas that plague
merchandise goods trade. In fact, quantitative
restrictions on the number of service suppliers
or the amount of output are explicitly banned
under WTO rules.18 Instead, domestic regula-
tions behind the border exert a far stronger
impact on services trade flows.The difficulty of
converting the economic effect of these regula-
tions into “tariff equivalents” makes their effect
more difficult to measure because regulations
often apply to domestic and foreign service
providers alike, and the import-discriminating
effect of the policy is difficult to judge.
The relative lack of clarity about the effects
of services trade restrictions is compounded by
the lack of data on services trade flows (some-
times called “invisible trade”).19 Although there
6
Increased trade in
services is likely
to benefit the
United States,
and fears about
mass job losses are
unfounded.
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are far fewer categories of services than the
number of goods—the typical tariff schedule
identifies thousands of goods and yet services
sectors are generalized in about 10 to 30 differ-
ent types, depending on the degree of disag-
gregation—the data on services are not as
comprehensive as those for goods.
The only collection of global statistics on ser-
vices trade is done by the International Mon-
etary Fund, based on balance-of-payments data.
The data collected do not neatly fit into the clas-
sifications used by the WTO to distinguish
between different ways of delivering services.
For example, balance-of-payments data do not
distinguish between cross-border supply and
consumption abroad, which are separate modes
of supply according to the WTO. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund considers that a firm or
person is a resident after one year, and so it does
not count transactions between the firm or per-
son and their host country as “cross-border” after
that time. Customs agents cannot observe and
record service flows across borders like they can
with goods—perhaps that is good news for free
trade, but it adds to the data gap.
Despite these obstacles, efforts to reduce
barriers to services trade continue. As is the
case with goods trade,many benefits of services
trade liberalization are available to countries
that autonomously open their markets to over-
seas providers. In the context of reciprocal trade
agreements, however, the general and long-
standing debate about the relative merits of
multilateral versus bilateral or regional trade
liberalization agreements extends to services
trade. Services are a relative newcomer to trade
agreements, and first became a part of regional
trade agreements in the early 1990s, forming
part of the WTO architecture only in the last
completed round of trade negotiations. Since
then, however, it appears that services trade lib-
eralization is easier to achieve through “agree-
ments of the willing” rather than in the multi-
lateral setting of the WTO.
Services in the WorldTrade Organization:
Slow Going
Trade in services in theWTO is governed by
the articles of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services and the specific lists of commitments
(called “schedules”) in services submitted by
WTO members.Unlike negotiations in agricul-
tural and industrial goods, which are largely dri-
ven by negotiations about tariff reduction for-
mulae that are to be applied to all (or most)
products, WTO members negotiate the open-
ing of services markets through a process of
requests and offers. Those offers are then
“bound” (unless explicitly left unbound) in the
sense that membersmay not increase restrictions
or impose new ones on foreign service providers,
thus giving a degree of commercial certainty.
New commitments can be added, or existing
commitments improved, at any time so long as
they increase market access. The GATS also
commits members to continue reforms through
successive negotiations on further liberalization.
While the GATS has not so far generated
significant liberalization (partly because it is a
relatively recent addition to the multilateral
trading system), much promise lies in its frame-
work and broad principles, including national
treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN)
provisions. That is, foreign service providers
should be afforded treatment no less favorable
than domestic providers, and all WTO mem-
bers should receive equal treatment.
Countries usually include two types of
restrictions in their services schedule: “horizon-
tal” limitations (e.g., those that require all nat-
ural persons to apply for a working visa before
entry), which refer to limitations on all sectors
listed in the schedule, and sector-specific devi-
ations from MFN and national treatment.
Members are free to list exemptions from
MFN treatment, for example by giving prefer-
ential treatment to one of its trade partners.
Most WTO members have listed their ser-
vices commitments in the GATS using what is
known as a “positive list” approach. Under that
principle, only those services explicitly record-
ed as such will be liberalized according to the
terms of the agreement; unlisted sectors are
assumed to be closed. The services industry is
rapidly changing because of advancements in
technology and consumers’ evolving tastes,
therefore, ongoing negotiations are crucial
under a positive-list approach in order to cover
7
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newly invented sectors or service types.A “neg-
ative list” approach, on the other hand, pre-
sumes that new sectors will be traded freely and
is therefore preferable: any markets for newly
invented services are automatically open.
In the WTO, services are categorized
according to four “modes” of delivery. (The
WTO views trade as occurring between coun-
tries across political borders, rather than between
private actors.) Mode 1 (cross-border supply)
refers to services supplied from one country to
another, such as international telephone calls
and call-center operations. Mode 2 (consump-
tion abroad) occurs when nationals of one coun-
try consume the service in another; tourism is
the most obvious example.Mode 3 (commercial
presence) is when a firm originating in one
country sets up a subsidiary or foreign branch in
another, as in banking operations, through for-
eign direct investment. Mode 4 (presence of
natural persons) is when nationals of one coun-
try travel to another to supply a service; for
example, accountants traveling outside their
home country for a stint working abroad.
Granting temporary entry of professionals is
the most contentious form of service supply
because it is essentially dealing with immigra-
tion (albeit temporary): some politicians think
that the issue should not be included in trade
pacts. Barriers to the temporary movement of
workers are more stringent than those on other
modes of supply.That may account for the rela-
tively small proportion of services trade that
WTO researchers estimate is delivered through
Mode 4, as shown in Table 2.20
The GATS is far from being a “free-trade
agreement in services.” Government services, for
example, are excluded from GATS coverage and
are not covered by its disciplines, and there is no
compulsion to open government services to for-
eign competitors under its terms.21 Air transport,
an important service sector, is at present largely
excluded from WTO commitments, although
many bilateral agreements on air transport ser-
vices are in force. Most services relating to water
distribution,water supply, and energy exploration
and ownership are excluded.Therefore, true lib-
eralization has thus far been scant. As a World
Bank working paper says, “Virtually all existing
GATS commitments . . . reflect a binding of the
status quo rather than liberalization.”22 The fail-
ure to conclude the Doha round of trade negoti-
ations has not helped on that score.
That is ironic, because services liberalization
through the WTO may unlock the Doha round
talks: the European Union and United States
have indicated that improved access to other
members’ servicesmarkets are necessary for them
to improve their offers on agricultural market
access and domestic support (i.e., subsidies). In a
meeting with WTO Director-General Pascal
Lamy in August 2008, the Coalition of Service
Industries made clear that its export interests lay
in Malaysia, Thailand, and especially, Indonesia.
At the same meeting, the coalition also indicated
that liberalizing rules on commercial presence
(Mode 3)—for example, increasing the equity
holdings that U.S. companies could own in firms
abroad—was the main vehicle through which it
wanted to access markets abroad.23 The U.S.
Trade Representative has publicly entreated U.S.
trade partners to lower their barriers to financial
services, legal services, telecommunications,
express delivery and logistics, energy services,
environmental services, and higher education.24
In turn, countries such as India are asking for
improved access in Mode 4—that is, the tempo-
rary cross-border movement of labor. Several
African countries have also indicated that Mode
4 liberalization is necessary for them to sign off
on a deal, too.
The United States Trade Representative
office has made it clear that it has very little if
any interest in increasing its offer on temporary
foreign workers, and indeed it questions the
emphasis that developing countries have placed
on increased access for their people to work in
the United States: “It’s hard to understand the
urgency of the developing country request [on
new temporary entry commitments] with
respect to the United States, since our existing
temp entry commitments are among the most
generous of allWTOmembers in terms of entry
categories covered and the fact that they apply to
all services sectors where we have commit-
ments.”25 The only offers the United States has
made in Mode 4 are to increase the clarity of
procedures for admitting temporary workers
8
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and to increase the amount of information about
the program on the Internet. In any case,WTO
members may have to give access to temporary
workers on a non-MFN basis because migration
flows require some level of cooperation between
immigration authorities, which may differ from
country to country.
In addition to the multilateral GATS, the
WTO is the custodian of certain auxiliary
agreements that are products of negotiations
between a subset of WTO members conducted
in the immediate aftermath of the Uruguay
round’s conclusion in 1994 in an attempt to
increase liberalization commitments in certain
service sectors. The Understanding on Com-
mitments in Financial Services was entered into
force in 1997 in order to facilitate special liber-
alization in financial services, such as banking
and securities services.26
Negotiations to increase liberalization of
international shipping and other services and
the use of ports were less successful. Slated for
conclusion by July 1996, the negotiations (to
which the United States was a party) failed,
and were eventually relaunched and then sub-
sumed into the general negotiations on services
as part of the suspended Doha round. Similar
negotiations on basic telecommunications ser-
vices were, however, successful and the 69
mainly developed countries (including the
United States) who signed the Agreement on
Basic Telecommunications Services agreed to
increased market access through commercial
presence (Mode 3) and cross-border supply
(Mode 1). So, negotiations through the WTO
have not been a complete waste of time.
The Relative Success of Bilateral and
RegionalTrade Agreements
Although they are in some significant ways
inferior to multilateral trade liberalization
agreements, bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments can lower prices for consumers and lead
to significant market openings in covered sec-
tors. In fact, the North American Free Trade
Agreement was a pioneer in this area, being the
first trade deal to introduce comprehensive ser-
vices trade liberalization.27
In contrast to the positive listing approach in
the GATS, the services sections of the bilateral
and regional agreements signed by the United
States (most of them modeled on NAFTA)
employ the negative listing approach. A recent
study by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development has shown that
the trade agreements signed by the United States
in recent years, inspired by NAFTA, have led to
more liberalization than GATS-inspired region-
al agreements (i.e., those that employ a positive
listing approach).28 That is to be expected, since
WTO members are bound to liberalize a “sub-
stantial” number of sectors and to provide for
“the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination” in the covered sectors in their
preferential trade agreements.29 In order to com-
ply with WTO rules, preferential trade deals
need to provide for more market openings than
does the GATS itself.
The United States has achieved modest lib-
eralization in some areas through major bilater-
al and regional trade agreements, but the com-
mitments made by the parties often go beyond
that which has been achieved in the WTO and
thus represent increased opportunities for
9
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Table 2
International Service Trade by Mode of Supply, 2005
Mode of Supply Category Share (%)
Mode 1 Cross-border supply 25–30
Mode 2 Consumption abroad 10–15
Mode 3 Commercial presence 55–60
Mode 4 Presence of natural persons Less than 5
Source: World Trade Organization.
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American firms, workers, and consumers. The
U.S. International Trade Commission recently
noted that U.S. preferential trade agreements
often provide additional regulatory transparency
and, in some cases, have even involved the mod-
ification of national regulatory regimes that were
impeding services trade.30 Many restrictions
remain in place for licensing and qualifications
for certain workers (e.g. citizenship or residency
qualifications), including psychologists, teachers,
and even (in the case of the agreement with
Nicaragua) toxic waste handlers. But in audiovi-
sual, insurance, education, finance, and road
transport sectors (NAFTA), progress has been
made beyond that which could have been
achieved through the WTO alone.
Other bilateral agreements not related to
broader trade pacts have managed to improve
market access where the WTO has not even
managed to begin negotiations, particularly in
airline competition. The United States has
signed bilateral aviation agreements with over 90
countries.31 Most notably, the EU–U.S. Open
Skies Agreement came into effect in March
2008, and allows any airline of the European
Union and any airline of the United States to fly
between any point in one region to any point in
the other, and for airlines of the United States to
fly between points in theEuropeanUnion (a rec-
iprocal right was not given to EU airlines to
operate between points in the United States).An
agreement with China on liberalized air trans-
port came into effect in July 2007.32
MustTry Harder
The degree of openness in the United
States varies by sector. Banking and insurance,
for example, are relatively open. In retail, most
remaining barriers are in the area of commer-
cial presence (i.e., the setting up of affiliate
firms), since for now Internet-based retail is
still relatively small. At the federal level, pro-
fessional and business services are quite open to
foreigners, as are entertainment services. But
significant barriers remain.
An indication of the effect of U.S. regulations
on services is shown inTable 3.The data are from
a joint project by the Australian National
University and the Australian Productivity
Commission that measures restrictions on trade
in services for a number of regions.33 The re-
searchers have converted information about a
country’s regulations into a “restrictiveness
index.” The more restrictions and the greater
their severity (as measured by weightings), the
higher the index number is.
Notwithstanding theWTO’s goal of treating
domestic and foreign service providers identical-
ly, in some cases domestic and foreign firms face
different regulations, or else the same regulations
place different (usually more onerous) require-
ments on foreign firms.The degree of discrimi-
nation (i.e., the extra burden that falls on foreign
firms) can be derived by subtracting the foreign
restrictiveness index number in a sector from the
domestic restrictiveness index number. Of
course, regulations that restrict competition and
entry of new firms in the domestic sector exclu-
sively are of concern, too, but they are not the
primary focus here.
In the second step, the researchers estimated
the effect of the regulations on prices and costs
using an econometric model. The price/cost
index thus measures the extent to which regula-
tions confer a price advantage on, or add to the
costs of, firms in that industry, allowing them to
collect economic rents over and above that
which would occur in the absence of regulations
(or, in the case of raising costs, add to the price
paid by consumers of that service, assuming the
higher costs can be passed on). It can be thought
of as a tax equivalent of the price or cost effect of
restrictions in that service sector.
Combining these two indices gives an indi-
cation of the total cost borne by consumers of
these services as a result of import discrimina-
tion. For example, a service sector that had a
high trade restrictiveness score (indicating dis-
crimination against foreign service providers)
and a high price/cost index score would suggest
that the sector would benefit from liberaliza-
tion. A service sector with low trade restrictive-
ness and price/cost scores would suggest that a
sector is fairly open, and the firms involved do
not collect significant rents compared with a
no-regulation scenario.
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To help judge how restrictive the United
States is compared to other countries in the
survey, the rank of the United States appears
next to the sector, with a high ranking indicat-
ing a less open market (not all countries appear
in all indices because of data availability). For
example, in maritime services the United
States has the third-most restricted market out
of 35 countries surveyed. U.S. distribution ser-
vices and legal services are mid-ranking in effi-
ciency.The United States’ regime appears to be
the least regulatory in accountancy services.
Keep in mind that because rankings show U.S.
performance relative to other countries in the
survey, the United States may rank relatively
well in terms of openness (e.g., in banking) and
yet still impose a relatively high tax equivalent
of firms in that industry. The U.S. record is
mixed at best. For a country that aspires to be
the world’s most competitive and dynamic, fur-
ther reforms are needed.
Benefits to Developing and Developed
Countries Alike
Although developed countries are the source
of many global services firms, the benefits of
opening up service markets do not depend on a
country’s level of development: rich and poor
nations can profit. A mercantilist would suggest
that only developed countries gain from pursu-
ing open servicesmarkets because of their export
interests and capacity. But a number of studies
have shown that unilaterally liberalizing services
can bring enormous benefits to developing
countries, too, especially where trade in services
involves the spread of technology. While the
extent of gains depends on the initial level of
regulation and subsequent opening,World Bank
economist Aaditya Mattoo and his colleagues
found that countries with fully open telecom
and financial services sectors grow at a rate of up
to 1.5 percentage points faster each year than do
other countries.34 Compounded over a couple of
decades, that would make a huge impact on liv-
ing standards.
It is clear, then, that remaining impediments
to growth of services trade are also a limit on
economic growth in general.Brown,Kiyota, and
Stern (2005), using the Michigan Model of
World Production and Trade, find that a com-
pletely free global trade in services would
increase global GDP by $1.661 trillion (or about
$250 per person)—more than 31 times the esti-
mated $53 billion in gains that would come
from complete liberalization of agricultural
trade, and more than twice the gains from free
manufacturing trade ($700 billion).The United
States would capture $466 billion of the gains
from free services trade, equivalent to about
$4,500 per U.S. household.35
So, how to capture those gains? In many
senses, services trade liberalization and the ben-
efits that flow from it will come automatically
where government does not get in the way of
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Table 3
United States Restrictions on Foreign Service Providers and Cost Effects
Trade Restrictiveness Price/Cost Effect Measures
Foreign-Domestic Index U.S. Rank Tax Equivalent U.S. Rank
Maritime 0.43 3 of 35 N/A
Legal 0.24 16 of 29 N/A
Distribution 0.16 11 of 38 2.30% 6 of 18
Architectural 0.11 29 of 41 N/A
Engineering 0.08 20 of 34 3.60% 10 of 20
Banking 0.06 35 of 38 4.80% 36 of 38
Accountancy 0.02 34 of 34 N/A
Telecommunications 0.00 115 of 136 0% 115 of 136
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Productivity Commission Studies, 2000.
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new businesses and technology. As economist
Jeffrey Sachs recently noted, “The digital divide
[between developed and developing countries]
is ending not through a burst of civic responsi-
bility, but mainly through market forces.”36 But
there are still some areas where governments can
take positive steps to eliminate harmful regula-
tions and special favors to domestic interest
groups, and where they can encourage other
governments to open their markets to services
imports. In fact, most of the remaining barriers
to services trade are regulatory rather than
explicitly trade related. Thus, there is a limit to
the ability of negotiated trade agreements to
achieve liberalization without also implement-
ing unilateral regulatory reforms.
The U.S. market for most services is already
relatively open, and its exports in many sectors
are globally competitive. In telecommunications,
for example,American firmsmake up 3 of the 10
largest global firms by revenue and have their eye
on the fast-growing developing countries in the
Asia Pacific region, Latin America, the Middle
East, and Africa, where market penetration rates
are low and regulatory barriers to new entrants
are relatively high (e.g.,, many governments jeal-
ously guard the issuing of licenses to mobile
operators and limit foreign ownership).37 Ameri-
can trade negotiators are thus usually motivated
by a mercantilist mindset and are keen to pro-
mote services chapters of preferential trade
agreements.They have also been key proponents
of WTO agreements that promote further ser-
vices trade liberalization in other countries.
To the extent that trade negotiators are able to
encourage reform abroad, the Coalition of
Services Industries, a U.S.-based trade group,
identifies five main impediments where the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should
focus its efforts:
• foreign equity restrictions that limit the
investment opportunities for foreign
firms and the inflow of foreign capital so
helpful to the growth of domestic firms
(e.g., the 26 percent cap on foreign own-
ership of insurance firms in India);
• market entry requirements such as high
capital requirements that impose a heavy
burden for would-be services exporters
(e.g., those stipulated for telecommunica-
tions firms in China);
• exacting requirements on the form that
investments should take when establish-
ing a business, which limit a firm’s flexi-
bility and business development (e.g., the
economic needs test in Malaysia that
allows the government to reject applica-
tions, such as those for additional bank
branches if the market is deemed to be
“saturated”);
• regulations that are not “national treat-
ment” compliant, and instead discrimi-
nate against foreign firms; and
• unpredictable and unclear implementa-
tion of regulations and licensing approval
processes that generate a lack of commer-
cial certainty.38
We have already seen that the United
States, while by no means the most protected
services market, can make some improvements
of its own. Professional services (accounting,
legal services, architecture, and engineering) are
to a large extent regulated by the individual
states. Although consistent with federalism
and the principle of most-devolved jurisdic-
tion, this makes importing to the United States
difficult when state-level regulations are vastly
different or cumbersome, although in practice
there is much commonality between many
states’ provisions.39 The United States main-
tains horizontal discriminatory restrictions on
the temporary entry of workers into the United
States, on the ability of foreign entities to
acquire federal land (and, in some states, pri-
vate land), on differential taxation measures,
and the ability of noncitizens to receive gov-
ernment subsidies and loans.
Domestic transportation is an obvious early
candidate for reform, because so much of it
remains relatively closed. While American
banks, telecommunications, logistics, and express
delivery firms are world-class,U.S. rail, road, and
air transport industries remain protected, with a
predicable effect on costs and competitiveness:
although faring well on infrastructure, logistics
competence,and othermeasures of getting goods
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quickly to market, the United States ranked a
woeful 144th place in domestic logistics costs on
a recent global survey of logistical perfor-
mances.40
A lack of domestic freight-rail competition
and restrictions on cross-border trucking
beyond limited border zones is responsible for
much of the low ranking.Antitrust exemptions
for railroad firms have led to a high concentra-
tion of firms in the railroad services industry,
leaving American firms with an expensive ser-
vice and an unattractive environment for for-
eign investors.41 Domestic transport costs are
an estimated $200 million to $400 million
higher than they would be if the current ban on
Mexican trucks on U.S. roads were lifted.That
ban remains in place outside of a narrow com-
mercial zone just north of the U.S.–Mexican
border, despite NAFTA provisions to grant full
access and even though the safety fears of the
Teamsters have proved to be unfounded—in
2005, fewer Mexican trucks were deemed out-
of-service as a result of failed inspections than
American trucks.42 As the U.S. International
Trade Commission argues, allowing Mexican
trucks to haul goods within the United States
would allow Mexican truckers’ wages to rise,
and U.S. trucking firms to benefit from lower
investment restrictions in Mexico.43
Allowing foreign-owned or foreign-operat-
ed aircraft to fly domestically (i.e., within the
United States) is still barred, even as the gov-
ernment has made impressive efforts to allow
foreign airliners to land in American airports.
Under the Fly America Act,U.S.-government-
financed transport of passengers or cargo is
allowed only on U.S. air carriers, similar to the
restriction on maritime transport. Allowing a
more competitive air service industry would
bring benefits to consumers of air transport
service, as well as to taxpayers. Indeed, a study
available from a link on the U.S. State
Department’s own website touts the benefits of
the 1978 (partial) deregulation of the U.S. air-
lines market and the gains that have emerged
from the EU Single Aviation Market:
The creation of the Single European
Aviation Market in 1993 led to an aver-
age annual growth rate in traffic
between 1995 and 2004 that was almost
double the rate of growth in the years
1990 to 1994.This produced about 1.4
million new jobs.44
Presumably, similar benefits would flow from
opening the U.S. airline market to overseas
competition.
In addition to opening up the woefully pro-
tected land and air services industries, maritime
transport is one areawhere the government could
immediately save consumers and taxpayers some
money. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(commonly known as the “Jones Act”) stipulates
that all cargo shipped between U.S. ports be car-
ried on U.S.-built, U.S.-operated, and U.S.-
owned vessels, in order to protect the domestic
shipping industry from foreign competition and
to encourage the viability of the domestic ship-
ping industry for use in times of war.
Given that a substantial part—over one-
third—of U.S. water-borne commerce in 2006
was between U.S. ports,45 the potential savings
from allowing foreign ships to compete for this
business would be significant. A 1995 study by
the International Trade Commission estimated
that the Jones Act alone costs U.S. businesses
and consumers $2.8 billion annually (1995 dol-
lars) in increased shipping costs, mainly because
of the relatively high cost of domestic labor for
maintenance and staffing.46 In addition, cargo
preference laws dictate that most government-
owned cargo,military cargo, and most U.S. food
aid must be shipped on U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built,
and U.S.-operated vessels. Overall, the U.S.
International Trade Commission estimates that
U.S.-flagged tankers cost over $10,000 a day
more to operate than do their foreign competi-
tors, and U.S.-flagged containerships over
$12,000 a day more.47
Unfortunately, the United States has shown
little appetite for making the necessary reforms.
During the 1986–94 Uruguay round negotia-
tions, the United States successfully argued that
maritime services should be excluded from
national treatment rules in theWTO.That mis-
guided intransigence has continued, with the
United States walking out of post-Uruguay
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round talks that included maritime services in
the GATS and refusing point-blank to make
any commitments in the Doha round on mar-
itime services. The United States should recon-
sider the benefits and costs of maritime trans-
port restrictions.
The United States did not participate in the
post-Uruguay round negotiations on improv-
ing commitments in the movement of natural
persons.Only Australia,Canada, the European
Union, India,Norway, and Switzerland offered
more access than that which was achieved in
the Uruguay round—agreeing, for example, to
increase the permitted length of stay for a busi-
ness person. One study suggests that if OECD
countries were to improve access to their mar-
kets for foreign temporary workers, both
skilled and unskilled, equal to just 3 percent of
the labor force, the global gains (shared among
the country of origin, the host country, and the
migrant workers themselves) would reach over
$150 billion.48 Clearly some liberalization of
the temporary movement of workers is in
America’s interest.49
Giving consumers the freedom to increase
consumption abroad is a promising source of
gains. For example, one study has shown that
allowing health insurance to be portable abroad
would save Americans over $1.4 billion a year,
even if only 10 percent of American patients
chose to have treatment abroad for 15 low-risk
procedures.50 There is scope for businesses and
consumers to be quite creative in “unbundling”
services and shopping around for the best
provider.
Conclusion
It is clear that the United States has much
to gain from a liberal world services trade.
With much potential for growth of services
exports, especially in rapidly growing develop-
ing countries, many U.S. firms are well placed
to take advantage of the growing demand for
services that appears, in some areas at least, to
be leveling off at home. But equally there are
areas of the U.S. economy that are in need of
further liberalization and less government con-
trol, regardless of what other countries do to
liberalize their markets.
The United States should continue to press
its trade partners to lower their barriers to ser-
vices imports, even if efforts so far have been
frustrated. In December 2007, for example, the
United States submitted a request on behalf of
a number of mainly developed WTO members
for increased access to the telecommunication
markets of 22 other WTO members through
the removal of national treatment and market
access limitations and by broadening the defi-
nition of which services are covered under the
“telecommunications” heading. That request
was rejected by the recipient members, who
even refused to bind current levels of liberaliza-
tion.51 As suggested above, however, the gains
from an open telecommunications market may
become self-evident and, in the end, prove too
tempting to obstruct. One hopes that is the
case for many other services so crucial to eco-
nomic development.
So long as global economic growth and trade
and demand for services that support develop-
ment and the functioning of markets continue,
the future remains bright for American services
firms in diverse fields such as telecommunica-
tions, logistics, express delivery, distribution, and
finance. But while exports will likely continue to
grow largely organically despite the remaining
obstacles abroad,American consumers and firms
can still benefit from further reforms at home.
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